British political responses to the german refugee crisis during occupation

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HOW TO CITE THIS SCHOLARLY ESSAY: Anderson, Benjamin. "British Political Responses to the German Refugee Crisis during Occupation" Institute for Research of Expelled Germans. http://expelledgermans.org/britishpoliticalresponses_anderson.html (accessed Day-Month-Year).

 

BY BENJAMIN ANDERSON

(Editor's Note: this is Chapter 2 out of a Dissertation; see Chapters 2, 4, and 5).

On 5 June 1945, Britain took control of its occupation zone in Western Germany, which included Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, North West-Rhine and the Ruhr. This area had once been Germany’s economic centre; in 1945, however, it was a shadow of its once productive self. When Victor Gollancz visited the zone in October and November 1946, the conditions were still sub-standard. For example, one morning he stepped out onto a cold, frosty street in Hamburg. Rubble remained strewn everywhere, the pavement and roads were almost indistinguishable, and the buildings continued to have gaping holes. A teenage boy, dressed in a jumper, shorts and no shoes, shuffled in front of Gollancz and stopped at a row of large tin buckets that were filled to the brim with peoples’ garbage. He shivered as he rustled through the bins in the hope of unearthing some food. For Gollancz, it was a wretched sight, but as one Düsseldorf education officer later suggested, it was all too common.i

Britain’s zone was in chaos: food, shelter, medicine, clothing and water were all in short supply, and it only got worse as more expellees and refugees streamed in from the East. Despite the existence of Allied agreements in late 1945, the transfers were often as unorganised as they were in the summer. On 20 November 1945, the Allied Control Council (ACC) agreed to the removal of 6,650,000 Germans from Eastern Europe to the various occupied zones of Germany. ii Around the same time, Britain and Russia agreed to split 3.5 million Western Poland expellees between their respective zones, in what later came to be part of ‘Operation Swallow’. It was hope that ‘Swallow’ would help stem the massive tide of expellees arriving in Britain’s zone, but the operation did not eventually start until 20 February 1946.

Even when ‘Swallow' begun, the arrivals overwhelmed Britain. Between February and July 1946, some 8,000 were daily entering from Poland—although, in July, this number dropped to 5,000. Corresponding with these legal arrivals were illegal arrivals, which amounted to approximately 25,000 people per week until October. Simultaneously, only 1,200 were leaving the zone per week. iii Most of these legal arrivals were Germans under ‘Swallow', but many also arrived from the Soviet zone, and some were Jewish victims of the 1944 to 1946 Jewish pogroms in Poland. iv

Not only was Britain under pressure to provide for an increasingly overcrowded zone, but it also had to rebuild German infrastructure and democracy; while it concurrently tried to rebuild its own country and ensure the British people survived. The problem of the occupation's food was particularly acute and partly caused Britain to fuse their zone with the American zone on 1 January 1947, which created Bizonia. Ultimately, all of the issues that Britain faced, coupled with pressure from communism and Russia's menace, complicated the Government and press's attitude towards the food crisis and the erection of German democracy. In short, two conflicting ideals not only divided people but also united them: humanitarianism and Vansittartism.

A lack of food was a root problem in the German humanitarian crisis because without food the German workers and people would not have the energy to rebuild the zone. They were ‘famine stricken', concluded Lord Saltoun after a visit to Germany in 1946.v Adolf Hitler's scorched earth policy during the SS and Wehrmacht's retreat in 1945, as well as a heavy rainfall in Western Germany throughout the summer of 1945, primarily created this crisis. vi By early 1946, the food crisis had grown significantly worse; in March, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery was forced to cut German rations to 1,000 calories a day—just 200 above those of the Belsen inmates.vii Various internment camps, where refugees and expellees lived, also showed the food crisis's grave results. For example, at a Paderborn internment camp, a British nutrition team found 60 percent of their investigated men were ‘markedly thin', with many unable to stand tall because their muscle tissue had faded. viii Across Germany, there was also a major occurrence of oedema, which Gollancz documented throughout his book In Darkest Germany (1947).ix Through several images, he showed German men, women and children who were little more than skeletons. x

It was previously shown that the Save Europe Now campaign (SEN) helped to breathe a new element of morality into British politics, but the Labour Government's reaction to the food crisis suggests that this new attitude quickly expired. In its response, morality and Vansittaritsm divided various Labour politicians; arguably, there were just as much, if not more, Labour politicians who subscribed to Vansittartism rather than Gollancz's compassionate way of thinking. xi Significantly, four of the most influential members of the Labour administration showed traits of Vansittartism, while some simultaneously exhibited elements of humanitarianism: Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin, Hugh Dalton and Ben Smith.xii

For some politicians and the press, the British people were the top priority. Smith was the Minister of Food and was therefore pivotal in SEN's campaign to donate rations to Germans. Smith categorically rejected the idea of giving rations to Germans, as he stated in October 1945, ‘While I hold this job, unless there are shortages over which no one has control, I will not be a party to reducing rations to this country below their present standard'. xiii The Lancashire Evening Post supported Smith as it described him as ‘a doughty champion of the interests of the common people’ who placed British post-war recovery over that of Germany.xiv Other less significant political figures, such as Thomas Morris, Mayor of Lewes, similarly expressed this opinion. He insisted he could not allow any food to leave for Germany ‘until our own people are properly fed’.xv It was not until 9 February 1946 that the Government allowed people to buy specific food to help German mothers and babies. It was then not until November 1946 that the Government allowed people to send their rations to the Germans voluntarily. Such delays emphasised the Government’s position, in which British self-interest transcended Germany.

Other senior political figures tried to play down Britain's responsibility to help the Germans. Instead, they complained about the failure of other countries, which had exacerbated the problems beyond Britain's control. Bevin was one of these figures. He blamed Russia for the German peoples' plight: if the expulsions had not taken place at the time they should have, he claimed, then the food problem ‘would not have been so tragic'. He concluded that Russian pressure on Poland and Czechoslovakia had aggravated the problem. xvi Additionally, he complained that Britain had done more than enough to help the Germans, while North and South America did very little. xvii Herbert Morrison, Deputy Prime Minister, was another figure that complained Britain had done more than enough to help the Germans. In a Cabinet meeting on 3 December 1945, he said, ‘We are being asked to do more than we sh[oul]d.—displaced persons etc, and fewer resources. U.S. can afford more easily to help’.xviii Morrison's attitude, in particular, contrasted significantly with the nationalistic attitudes that some within Britain expressed during the summer and autumn of 1945. Indeed, Morrison's position was an admittance that Britain was not one of the new Superpowers, because it could not compete with Russia and America’s resources and populations.

So, there existed a definite element within British politics and media who were unwilling to help the Germans. This position was not necessarily out of spite or anger but somewhat out of the belief that for Britain to have a better recovery, the people had to be healthy. To an extent, there was a nationalistic element to this argument, which both Gollancz and Vansittart supporters exhibited. For many in Britain, the country was seen as Europe's saving grace, because it was not invaded and consumed by fascism; therefore, Britain could show Europe the way with its liberal principles. However, this nationalistic component resonated with the idea of Vansittartism, for if Britain attempted to rebuild a new Germany, then there was a risk of a resurgent German thirst for war, which would place a weak Britain into a worrying position—something it was already in because of Russia's westward expansion. British politics debated who Britain's biggest danger was: while one MP claimed Germany was the ‘cardinal problem', Bevin insisted Russia posed an even more significant threat. xix In toto, through its attitude towards Occupied Germany during the food crisis, British politicians resolved that Britain could only protect Europe from Russia’s communism and a resurgent, violent Germany, once it had rebuilt itself first.

As the world edged closer to the Cold War, communism’s specter and the Eastern Bloc’s formation overtook British concerns about a resurgent Germany. It explains why Labour politicians resisted public demands to give food to Europe, because they wanted Britain to be at its strongest, mentally, physically, and financially, when combatting the new problems communism created. British strength was a message that was repeatedly stressed by the newspapers and politicians during the winter of 1945 and early 1946. In October, Smith highlighted that ‘Europe [could not] profit if the British standard of living is depressed further’.xx The Birmingham Daily Post reiterated this stance the following month.xxi The Daily Herald portrayed Britain as Europe's saviour for the continent was ‘still looking to Britain for leadership'. xxii Sir Basel Neven-Spence, MP for Orkney and Shetland, called on Britain to lead a Western European bloc to counter Russia and the Eastern Bloc.xxiii This element of nationalism discussed above was therefore evident in the rhetoric of many that were less than happy about intervening in Europe: for Europe to survive, Britain had to endure first.

The conditions which the expellee Germans had aggravated, therefore, forced Britain into an unenviable dilemma: Britain now had to choose whom it helped more, themselves or Germany. Either choice could prove to be potentially fatal for Britain and Europe. If Britain chose to help itself, then it was likely Germany would slide further into a humanitarian crisis and become an ineffective buffer against communist Russia; however, if Britain chose to help Germany then Britain would find itself struggling to recover from the precarious position it was in—this would also allow Germany to quickly catch up with Britain economically and militarily, which scared many throughout the Government. Fear of either result consequently restricted the Labour Government’s compassionate attitudes.

The Labour administration’s compassion, however, was also restricted by many of its politicians’ Vansittartism. Throughout Government, there was an agreement that Germany was a lost cause; an argument that was reminiscent of claims in Sir Robert Vansittart’s book Black Record: Germans Past and Present (1941). The Government pessimistically approached their occupation in Germany. At one Cabinet meeting, it was claimed that ‘there can be no hope for the liberalism in Germany' because the Germans were, ‘in the political sense, irresponsible'. Furthermore, they were communal people, not individuals, and were, therefore, more than likely to join the East. xxiv Sir Norman Brook, Additional Secretary to the Cabinet, described the Germans as immature and inexperienced with significant responsibilities.xxv The continual depiction of Germany being an immature and inexperienced country signifies Britain's intention to use liberal imperialism to make Germany a democratic country; in turn, it could be implied that Britain was showing benevolence towards the Germans by helping them to become a mature nation and people. In short, Germany was reduced to and treated like, one of Britain's previous colonial possessions.

The Labour Government decentralised Germany’s political authorities and, as Bevin highlighted, ‘endeavor[ed] to build a democracy from the bottom [up]’, by initially giving power to the local areas.xxvi The problems Britain faced, as previously noted, were on an enormous scale, and Britain was under extreme pressure to find solutions quickly. However, no panacea existed. To ease the burden on itself, the Germans were given responsibility for their problems by the British. It seemed Britain acted mainly in a consultant role, for a detachment of the British Military Government was placed on every level of local German politics. Maurice Edelman, Labour MP and novelist, hoped that this system would allow democracy to flourish outwards and spread across Germany.xxvii

Despite the fact that many members of the Government demonstrated Vansittartism, their decision to place a British representative on each level of German authority has humanitarian connotations, but it also emphasises the complex nature of British attitudes towards helping the Germans. On the one hand, it suggests the British Government provided a helping hand to every level of German politics and stressed the Government's belief that Germans were democratically immature: the British then took it upon themselves to guide the Germans in their pursuit of democracy. British help demonstrated the complexity of the British Government's attitudes, because while some implied Britain no longer had the resources to help like Russia and America, others argued that Britain was still a top power, for it could it decide which countries were democratic or not. On the other hand, however, we can argue that the humanitarianism shown by Britain was a ploy; it was not entirely helping the Germans but breaking them and their authoritarian characteristics to achieve British goals, namely Britain's security from Russia. This was made clear by one MP in 1946 who stated, ‘However guilty that country may be, and however much suffering they have inflicted on the world, it does not alter the fact that starving and hopeless people are not going to build a democratic state', which Western civilisation would hinge upon.xxviii Germany and its people were therefore seen as a piece in the Cold War chess game that would soon exist in 1947.

The Labour administration’s behaviour towards the occupation of Germany showed that the Labour support for SEN was not necessarily long-term and did not spread throughout the Labour Government. They were forced to confront the harsh reality that plagued the Germans, and their problems went well beyond the food crisis. There existed external, as well as, internal situations that impacted the occupation, and potentially weakened Britain. Ultimately, the British Government put the British people before the Germans .

Vansittartism dominated the Government's attitude as it implemented democracy in Germany through the British Government. Some politicians feared Germany was a war-mongering machine that was incapable of adopting democratic, and therefore Western, ideals. Thus, the Government saw itself as a consultant, as it tried to guide Germany towards democracy. However, Britain also introduced democracy to counteract the spread of communism and Russia. A manifest complexity was, therefore, evident in the British Government's attitudes towards Germany and democracy. The British Government's desire to help make the Germans a democratic society showed its humanitarian spirit. But, humanitarian ideals did not entirely motivate the Government. Fear of a resurgent Germany, the spread of communist Russia, and the anxiety of hindering Britain's own post-war recovery was as much about British self-interest as it was in protecting future generations from the horrors of another catastrophic war.

 

 

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